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Global Responsibility and the United
States: The Constitutionality of the
International Criminal Court
by SHANNON K. SUPPLE*
As with astronomy the difficulty of recognizing the motion of the
earth lay in abandoning the immediate sensation of the earth's fixity
and of the motion of the planets, so in history the difficulty of recogniz-
ing the subjection of personality to the laws of space, time, and cause,
lies in renouncing the direct feeling of the independence of one's own
personality.'
I. Introduction
On July 17, 1998, delegates to the United Nations Diplomatic
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an Interna-
tional Criminal Court, meeting in Rome, Italy, established a perma-
nent international criminal court.' The Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court ("ICC") was created to facilitate trying
individuals responsible for the most serious crimes of global concern,
such as genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity The dele-
gates came from states, regional organizations, and non-governmental
organizations all over the world, and most of the states' representa-
tives signed this statute with a promise to take it back to their coun-
tries for ratification.4 At the end of the conference, however, the
signature of the delegates from one country, the United States, was
noticeably absent.5 The United States has been criticized both at
home and abroad for its failure to sign the document. The Clinton
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1. LEo TOLSTOY, WAR AND PEACE 1351 (Louise and Aylmer Maude trans., W. W.
Norton & Company, Inc. critical ed. 1966).
2. United Nations, Setting the Record Straight The International Criminal Court, at 1,
U.N. Doc. DPI/2012 (1998). (Hereinafter, "Setting the Record Straight.")
3. See id.
4. See United Nations, Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, at 9-14, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.183/10 (1998).
5. See United Nations, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Ratification
Status (visited Oct. 12, 1999) <http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/status.htm>.
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Administration, Congress, and many American commentators take
the view that, in its present form, many provisions of the ICC statute
violate the due process clause of the United States Constitution. This
Note will review various provisions of the ICC statute and argue that
the ICC statute comports with due process requirements. Moreover,
this Note will also advocate that the United States sign and ratify the
ICC statute and continue to lead the way toward global responsibility
for human rights.
H. The International Criminal Court Statute
The need for an international criminal court was recognized even
before World War I.6 But the Nuremberg and Tokyo war crimes
tribunals following that war were the first manifestations of this recog-
nition.7 The war crimes tribunals marked the first time that the inter-
national community attempted to hold individuals and states
accountable for serious violations of international law.8 Unfortu-
nately, the tribunals were also seen as unfair, arising out of post-war
victor's justice.9 Though talk of a permanent criminal court did not
end, political indecision stalled possibilities of creating such a tribunal
throughout the Cold War era.10 But serious violations of international
law on two continents again renewed interest in creating a permanent
court." The recent atrocities committed in the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda horrified the international community to such an extent that
the United Nations Security Council created ad hoc tribunals to inves-
tigate the atrocities and prosecute those individuals allegedly respon-
sible for them.' These events led the international community to
realize the need for a permanent mechanism through which such
atrocities may be investigated and individuals committing crimes of
global concern prosecuted.'"
The preamble of the ICC statute states that "the most serious
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not
go unpunished and... their effective prosecution must be ensured by
taking measures at the national level and by enhancing international
cooperation."' 4 The delegates representing the international commu-
6. See Paul Marquardt, Law Without Borders: The Constitutionality of an Interna-
tional Criminal Court, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 73, 80-81 (1995).
7. See id. at 81-83.
8. See id. at 83.
9. See id.
10. See id. at 83-84.
11. See Setting the Record Straight, supra note 2, at 1.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. United Nations, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998,
U.N. Doe. AICONF.18319, preamble. (Hereinafter, "ICC statute.")
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nity of nations at the Rome Conference voted in favor of the ICC
statute overwhelmingly by a margin of 120 in favor to 7 against, with
21 abstentions. 5 This decision stood on a foundation of hope that the
vote would usher in a new era of global responsibility and acknowl-
edged that the world's worst human rights criminals must be brought
to justice. Thus far, 86 states have signed the ICC statute and four
have ratified. 6 The ICC statute will not enter into force until it is
ratified by 60 states.' 7
The ICC statute is long and complex, with many clauses provid-
ing for a variety of international concerns. Because of this breadth,
only a few key provisions will be addressed here. The first is the juris-
diction of the court. When a state ratifies the ICC statute, it accepts
the ICC's jurisdiction over all crimes within the scope of the statute.1 8
There is, however, one exception to this automatic jurisdiction. This
exception allows states to opt out of ICC jurisdiction over war crimes
committed on its territory or by its nationals for a period of seven
years after the ICC statute enters into force for that particular state.19
There are preconditions to the ICC's exercise of jurisdiction. Under
the ICC statute, the ICC may only exercise its jurisdiction over a mat-
ter if the state on whose territory the conduct in question occurred is a
party to the statute, or if the state of nationality of the accused is a
party to the statute, or if both states are parties. 20 It is important to
note, however, that as more states ratify the ICC statute, the closer
the ICC statute will come to conferring global jurisdiction over geno-
cide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.2'
A second key provision in the ICC statute regards the ICC's rela-
tionship to the United Nations Security Council. The Security Coun-
cil has one specific power over the ICC: it can suspend any
investigation or prosecution by the ICC for a twelve-month period,
15. See United Nations, U.N. Diplomatic Conference Concludes in Rome with Decision
to Establish Permanent International Criminal Court, U.N. Press Release IJROM/22
(1998), (visited Oct. 12, 1999) <http://www.un.org/icc/pressrel/Irom22.htm>.
16. See United Nations, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Ratification
Status, supra note 5.
17. ICC statute, supra note 14, art. 126 (1).
18. See ICC statute, supra note 14, art. 120. The ICC statute requires that "[n]o reser-
vations may be made" by any state to any portion of the ICC statute. Id.
19. See ICC statute, supra note 14, art. 124. The ICC statute enters into force for a
particular state either on the first day of the month after the sixtieth day following deposit
of the state's ratification or, if the state ratifies before the sixtieth instrument of ratification
is deposited with the United Nations, on the day that the statute enters into force gener-
ally. ICC statute, supra note 14, art. 126. This opt out provision is transitional only, al-
lowing states to come into ICC compliance, and is not renewable after the seven year cut
off. ICC statute, supra note 14, art. 124.
20. See ICC statute, supra note 14, art. 12 (2).
21. See ICC statute, supra note 14, art. 5 (1).
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which may be renewed.22 This deferral requires a decision by the Se-
curity Council as a whole, so that one state's veto cannot block ICC
jurisdiction. Allowing a single veto would cripple the ICC, giving Se-
curity Council members control over what matters the ICC may and
may not investigate?23
A third key provision in the ICC statute deals with protections
for accused persons. These protections are numerous, including
prohibitions against ex post facto laws, double jeopardy,' and un-
due delay;26 and the rights to counsel27 and an interpreter.' Though
it was a hotly debated issue at the Rome Conference and was not
included as a protection in the United Nations' ad hoc tribunals for
the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the ICC statute prohibits trials in
absentia.29 The ICC statute permits trials to proceed without the ac-
cused in attendance only if the accused is disruptive.3° But if this oc-
curs, the ICC must take measures to allow the accused to "observe the
trial and instruct counsel from outside the courtroom."'31 Because the
United States has criticized the ICC statute for lacking other specific
constitutional protections, those criticisms are discussed below, so that
they may be more fully addressed.
22. See ICC statute, supra note 14, art. 16.
23. See id. See also U.N. CHARTER, art. 27.
24. See ICC statute, supra note 14, art. 24 (1). The ICC statute states that "[n]o person
shall be criminally responsible under this Statute for conduct prior to the entry into force
of the Statute." Id.
25. See ICC statute, supra note 14, art. 20 (1). The ICC statute states that "no person
shall be tried before the Court with respect to conduct which formed the basis of crimes for
which the person has been convicted or acquitted by the Court." Id.
26. See ICC statute, supra note 14, art. 67 (1) (c). The ICC statute states that "the
accused shall be entitled to... be tried without undue delay." ICC statute, supra note 14,
art. 67 (1) and 67 (1) (c).
27. See ICC statute, supra note 14, art. 67 (1) (b). The ICC statute states that the
accused is entitled to "have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the
defen[s]e and to communicate freely with counsel of the accused's choosing in confidence."
Id.
28. See ICC statute, supra note 14, art. 67 (1) (f). The ICC statute states that the
accused is entitled to "have, free of any cost, the assistance of a competent interpreter and
such translations as are necessary to meet the requirements of fairness, if any of the pro-
ceedings of or documents presented to the Court are not in a language which the accused
fully understands and speaks." Id.
29. See ICC statute, supra note 14, art. 63 (1). See also ICC statute, supra note 14, art.
67 (1) (d).
30. See ICC statute, supra note 14, art. 63 (2).
31. Id.
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1H. Specific Concerns of the United States
A. United States Constitutional Concerns
1. Constitutional Criticisms within the United States
The following sections will analyze particular constitutional con-
cerns articulated by various members of the United States govern-
ment.32 Included in these criticisms are arguments that the ICC
statute does not guarantee an accused the right to a jury trial,33 the
right to confront witnesses against her,34 and the privilege against self-
incrimination.35 Additional United States concerns regarding the ICC
statute will be addressed in the next section. As discussed below,
however, these important constitutional concerns are addressed by the
ICC statute and thus do not preclude United States signature and
ratification.
Before proceeding, it should be noted that the constitutional
guarantees provided to accused persons by the United States Consti-
tution do not apply to persons accused in other nations.36 The
Supreme Court has held that American constitutional rights have no
relation to crimes either committed outside the jurisdiction of the
United States or to crimes that violate laws of foreign nations.37 In
addition, United States federal courts have also held that the Sixth
Amendment does not apply to extradition proceedings, because they
are not "criminal prosecutions," as the Sixth Amendment, by its
terms, requires.3 8 Thus, American citizens accused of crimes in for-
eign jurisdictions are not guaranteed their rights under the United
States Constitution. However, the ICC statute does offer anyone sub-
ject to its jurisdiction "minimum guarantees" which are very similar to
the United States' Bill of Rights and which may not be available to
32. See Ambassador David J. Scheffer, The Establishment of a Permanent International
Criminal Court: Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (visited Mar. 16,
1999) <http://www.state.gov/www/policy-remarks/1998/980723_scheffer_ icc.html>; see also
144 CONG. RFc. S8554 (daily ed. July 20, 1998) (statement of Sen. Ashcroft).
33. See 144 CONG. REc. S8554 supra, note 32.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XI; see also Kenneth J. Harris and Robert Kushen, Prose-
cuting International Crime: Surrender of Fugitives to the War Crimes Tribunals for Yugosla-
via and Rwanda: Squaring International Legal Obligations with the U.S. Constitution, 7
CRiM. L.F. 561, 597 (1996).
37. See Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 122 (1901).
38. See Martin v. Warden, 993 F.2d 824, 825 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding that there is no
due process right to a "speedy extradition"); Oen Ym-Choy v. Robinson, 858 F.2d 1400,
1406 (9th Cir. 1988) (confirming that the right to confront adverse witnesses does not apply
to extradition); Taylor v. Jackson, 470 F. Supp. 1290, 1292 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (holding that
the right to counsel does not apply to extradition).
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American citizens tried in foreign national courts.3 9 Thus, the ICC
statute may, in many cases, offer accused persons more protections
than if they were to be tried in various national courts. These protec-
tions are similar to the protections offered to accused persons in the
United States.
2. Right to a Jury Trial
The first major constitutional criticism articulated by the United
States is that the ICC statute does not offer an accused person the
right to a jury of his peers.40 The United States Constitution guaran-
tees the accused the right to "an impartial jury."41 The Supreme
Court has stated that "a general grant of jury trial for serious offenses
is a fundamental right, essential for preventing miscarriages of justice
and for assuring that fair trials are provided for all defendants."'42 The
ICC statute, however, does not allow for a trial by jury. Rather, the
ICC statute provides that a judicial Trial Chamber decide each case.43
The Trial Chamber, made up of an unspecified number of judges,
"shall attempt to achieve unanimity in their decision, failing which the
decision shall be taken by a majority of the judges."'  The Trial
Chamber of the ICC works the way a federal appellate court works in
the United States. The Trial Chamber's decision must be in writing
and "contain a full and reasoned statement of the Trial Chamber's
findings on the evidence and conclusions."45 When the decision is not
unanimous, the decision must contain both the views of the majority
and the dissenting minority.46
A jury trial is often considered a fundamental right in the United
States. But it is not feasible in the context of the ICC. First, the ICC
will be located at the Hague in the Netherlands.47 Of whom would
the jury be composed? A jury would have to be composed solely of
Dutch citizens or, perhaps, citizens of the Netherlands and nearby Eu-
ropean countries. A composition such as this would not be represen-
tative of a global court. Yet, to have jurors from all over the world
would be astronomically expensive. The jurors would have to be
transported from their home countries, given room and board while
jurors at the Hague, and transported back again. This would have to
be done for every case tried before the ICC.
39. ICC statute, supra note 14, art. 67 (1).
40. See 144 CONG. REC. S8554 (daily ed. July 20, 1998) (statement of Sen. Ashcroft).
41. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
42. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157-58 (1968).
43. See ICC statute, supra note 14, art. 74.
44. ICC statute, supra note 14, art. 74 (3).
45. ICC statute, supra note 14, art. 74 (5).
46. See id.
47. See ICC statute, supra note 14, art. 3 (1).
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Second, if the above were possible, there would be many addi-
tional concerns, both financial and judicial, such as the cost of inter-
preters for each juror. An interpreter for each juror would be very
expensive, especially because they would have to be paid in each case
and for every juror. And even with interpreters, how would the de-
fense and the prosecution be able to articulate fully their cases to the
jurors through the additional funnel of these varying interpretations of
their words? Surely, these considerations show that jury trials in the
ICC would not "preven[t] miscarriages of justice and... assur[e] ...
fair trials"4 but could, in fact, themselves create unjust and unfair
trials.
Finally, bench trials within the United States are not considered
fundamentally unfair.4 9 Rather, the decisions reached by judges in
criminal bench trials stand just as strongly in the eyes of the law as
those reached through jury trials.50 The Supreme Court has stated
that it "would not assert.., that every criminal trial - or any particu-
lar trial - held before a judge alone is unfair or that a defendant may
never be as fairly treated by a judge as he would be by a jury."51 Also,
American citizens tried in foreign jurisdictions would not necessarily
be guaranteed rights such as those in the ICC statute.52 In accord with
the view of the United Nations, the ICC statute "establishes the high-
est international standards and guarantees of due process and fair
trial. '53 Given all of these considerations, the ICC statute's use of a
bench trial with a panel of judges comports with the United States'
standard of due process so this portion of the statute does not compel
a finding of unconstitutionality.
3. Right to Confront Witnesses Against the Accused
The second major constitutional criticism articulated by the
United States is that the ICC statute does not offer an accused person
the right to confront witnesses against him.5" The United States Con-
stitution guarantees an accused person the right "to be confronted
with the witnesses against him."'55 The Supreme Court has concluded
that the right to confront the witnesses against an accused is "a funda-
mental right."56 Critics of the ICC statute claim that this right is not
guaranteed by the ICC statute, which renders the statute unconstitu-
48. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 158.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. Id.
52. See Harris and Kushen, supra note 36, at 598.
53. Setting the Record Straight, supra note 2, at 2.
54. See 144 CONG. RFC. S8554 (daily ed. July 20, 1998) (statement of Sen. Ashcroft).
55. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
56. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965).
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tional.17 But the ICC statute does give an accused the right to con-
front witnesses against her. The ICC statute provides, among its
minimum guarantees, that an accused has the right "[t]o examine, or
have examined, the witnesses against him or her."58 The statute also
provides that the "testimony of a witness at trial shall be given in per-
son." 9 There is a limited exception to this guarantee, but it only ap-
plies "to protect the safety, physical and psychological well-being,
dignity, and privacy of victims and witnesses." 60 In limited circum-
stances, to protect victims and witnesses, the statute allows in camera
testimony by electronic or other special means.61 To emphasize the
limited nature of this exception, the ICC statute itself states that "[i]n
particular, such measures shall be implemented in the case of a victim
of sexual violence or a child who is a victim or a witness, unless other-
wise ordered by the Court, having regard to all the circumstances."62
In addition, and most importantly, the ICC statute notes after each
mention of this exception that "[t]hese measures shall not be prejudi-
cial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused."'63 The United
States' own judicial system allows for this type of limited exception in
criminal trials.64 For example, the Supreme Court held in Maryland v.
Craig that
where necessary to protect a child witness from trauma that
would be caused by testifying in the physical presence of the
defendant, at least where such trauma would impair the child's
ability to communicate, the Confrontation Clause does not pro-
hibit use of a procedure that, despite the absence of face-to-face
confrontation, ensures the reliability of the evidence by subject-
ing it to rigorous adversarial testing and thereby preserves the
essence of effective confrontation.
In Craig, the Court allowed the use of a one-way closed circuit
television to protect a child victim of sexual abuse during the child's
testimony.66 The Craig court even used the same language as used in
the limited exception of the ICC statute: "a State's interest in the
physical and psychological well-being of child abuse victims may be
sufficiently important to outweigh, at least in some cases, a defend-
57. See 144 CONG. Rc. S8554 (daily ed. July 20, 1998) (statement of Sen. Ashcroft).
58. ICC statute, supra note 14, art. 67 (1) (e).
59. ICC statute, supra note 14, art. 69 (2).
60. ICC statute, supra note 14, art. 68 (1).
61. See ICC statute, supra note 14, art. 68 (2). These means include video or audio
technology, documents, and written transcripts. See ICC statute, supra note 14, art. 69 (2).
62. ICC statute, supra note 14, art. 68 (2).
63. ICC statute, supra note 14, art. 69 (2); see also ICC statute, supra note 14, art. 68
(1); and ICC statute, supra note 14, art. 68 (2).
64. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 844 (1990).
65. Id. at 857.
66. See id. at 852.
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ant's right to face his or her accusers in court."67 The ICC statute
does offer the right for an accused to confront witnesses against her.
Therefore, this portion of the statute does not compel a finding of
unconstitutionality.
4. Privilege Against Self-incrimination
The third major constitutional criticism articulated by the United
States is that the ICC statute does not offer an accused person the
privilege against self-incrimination.68 The United States Constitution
guarantees that the accused shall not be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself.69 The Supreme Court has rein-
forced the importance of "the Fifth Amendment's exception from
compulsory self-incrimination. ' 70 The ICC statute likewise offers this
protection, both to a suspect and to an accused.71 Frst, the ICC stat-
ute requires that a suspect of an investigation "[s]hall not be com-
pelled to incriminate himself or herself or to confess guilt."
72
Similarly, the ICC statute also requires that an accused person is
"[n]ot to be compelled to testify or to confess guilt and [be allowed] to
remain silent, without such silence being a consideration in the deter-
mination of guilt or innocence. '73 The ICC statute's guarantee is vir-
tually identical to the guarantee offered by the United States
constitution. Because the ICC statute offers an accused the privilege
against self-incrimination, this portion of the statute likewise does not
compel a finding of unconstitutionality.
5. Criminal Liability for Ill-defined Crimes
The fourth major constitutional criticism articulated by the
United States is that the ICC statute imposes criminal liability for
crimes which are not well-defined or specific enough to meet constitu-
tional standards.74 The United States Constitution prohibits criminal
liability for ill-defined crimes as a due process violation.' Due pro-
cess requires statutory specificity "to give due notice that an act has
been made criminal before it is done and to inform [an] accused of the
67. Id. at 857 (emphasis added); cf. ICC statute, supra note 14, art. 68 (1).
68. See 144 CONG. Rlc. S8554 (daily ed. July 20, 1998) (statement of Sen. Ashcroft).
69. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
70. Mallory v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964).
71. See ICC statute, supra note 14, art. 55 (1) (a) and ICC statute, supra note 14, art.
67 (1) (g).
72. ICC statute, supra note 14, art. 55 (1) (a).
73. ICC statute, supra note 14, art. 67 (1) (g).
74. See 144 CONG. REc. S8554 (daily ed. July 20, 1998) (statement of Sen. Ashcroft).
75. See U.S. CONsTr. amend. V; Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 230 (1951) (citing
Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939)) (noting that the "Court has repeatedly stated
that criminal statutes which fail to give due notice that an act has been made criminal
before it is done are unconstitutional deprivations of due process of law.").
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nature of the offense charged, so that he may adequately prepare and
make his defense."'76 This is not an issue under the ICC statute be-
cause the crimes under its jurisdiction are limited, specific, and well-
defined. The ICC statute states that a "person shall not be criminally
responsible under this Statute unless the conduct in question consti-
tutes, at the time it takes place, a crime within the jurisdiction of the
Court. ' 77 There are only four crimes within the jurisdiction of the
ICC; its jurisdiction is limited to only "the most serious crimes of con-
cern to the international community as a whole. '78 The four crimes
within ICC jurisdiction are the crime of genocide,7 9 crimes against hu-
manity,80 war crimes,81 and the crime of aggression.'
The delegates at the Rome Conference, however, were unable to
agree upon a definition for the crime of aggression, so they deferred
defining it as a crime within the statute until a working definition can
be determined.83 This makes the crime of aggression merely exhibi-
tory, because the ICC can only exercise jurisdiction over aggression
once the ICC statute is amended to include a definition of the crime
and the circumstances in which it can be prosecuted. 4 Yet, according
to the ICC statute, any crime may be added to the statute by amend-
ment, so this provision has little actual effect other than as an expres-
sion of the delegates' intent to include the crime of aggression in the
future.85 In regard to a future definition of the crime of aggression,
the ICC statute requires that a provision "be consistent with the rele-
vant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations."8 6 Under the
76. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 128 (1945) (Rutledge, J., concurring).
77. ICC statute, supra note 14, art. 22 (1).
78. ICC statute, supra note 14, art. 5 (1).
79. See ICC statute, supra note 14, art. 5 (1) (a). The ICC statute defines genocide as
one or more of five acts "committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
ethnical, racial or religious group." ICC statute, supra note 14, art. 6. These five acts are
(1) "[k]illing members of the group," (2) "[c]ausing serious bodily or mental harm to mem-
bers of the group," (3) "[d]eliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part," (4) "[i]mposing measures intended
to prevent births within the group," and (5) "[fjorcibly transferring children of the group to
another group." Id.
80. See ICC statute, supra note 14, art. 5 (1) (b). The ICC statute defines a crime
against humanity as one or more of 11 acts, such as murder, "committed as part of a wide-
spread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the
attack." ICC statute, supra note 14, art. 7(1).
81. See ICC statute, supra note 14, art. 5 (1) (c). The ICC statute defines war crimes as
"[g]rave breaches of the Geneva Conventions" and other serious violations of the laws and
customs surrounding armed conflict "committed as a part of a plan or policy or as part of a
large-scale commission of such crimes." ICC statute, supra note 14, art. 8.
82. See ICC statute, supra note 14, art. 5 (1) (d).
83. See Setting the Record Straight, supra note 2, at 1.
84. See ICC statute, supra note 14, art. 5 (2).
85. See ICC statute, supra note 14, art. 121.
86. ICC statute, supra note 14, art. 5 (2).
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United Nations Charter, a crime of aggression could not be investi-
gated or prosecuted until the Security Council makes a prior determi-
nation that an act of aggression has occurred.8 7 As a permanent
member of the Security Council, the United States holds enormous
power to determine whether any act would be prosecuted under the
ICC statute as a crime of aggression. 8 This provision moots any con-
cern on the part of the United States that its troops stationed in for-
eign lands might be prosecuted by the ICC for crimes of aggression. If
this situation ever surfaced, the United States could easily use its
power on the Security Council to find that no crime of aggression had
occurred.
The three other crimes listed above are defined within the ICC
statute.89 The ICC's definition of genocide 90 is the same as the defini-
tion contained in the 1948 Genocide Convention 9' and is well estab-
lished in international law. 2 The ICC's definition of crimes against
humanity93 is culled from many existing legal instruments94 and is also
well established in international law.95 In fact, the thresholds required
87. See U.N. CHARTER, art. 39.
88. See U.N. CHARTER, art. 23, para. 1.
89. See ICC statute, supra note 14, art. 6 (definition of genocide); ICC statute, supra
note 14, art. 7 (definition of crimes against humanity); and ICC statute, supra note 15, art. 8
(definition of war crimes).
90. See ICC statute, supra note 14, art. 6.
91. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. The United States ratified this convention on Nov. 25, 1988.
See United Nations Treaty Database (visited Oct. 12, 1999) <httpllwww.un.orglDepts/
Treaty/final/ts2/ newfiles/parLboo/ivboo/iv_l.html >.
92. The Genocide Convention has been ratified by 129 nations. See United Nations
Treaty Database (visited Oct. 12, 1999) <http://www.un.org1Depts/Treaty/final/ts2/
newfiles/parLbooliv booliv_.html >.
93. See ICC statute, supra note 14, art. 7.
94. These include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, G.A.
Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Pt. 1, at 71, U.N. Doe. A1810 (1948); the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 171. The
United States representative to the United Nations voted for the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights on Dec. 10, 1948. See United Nations, Fiftieth Anniversary of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, Press Kit (visited Oct. 12, 1999) <http:llwww.un.org/rights/
50/carta.htm>. The United States signed the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights on Oct. 5, 1977, but has not yet ratified it. See United Nations Treaty
Database (visited Oct. 12, 1999) <http:llwww.un.orglDeptslTreatylfnallts2/newfiles/
part_booliv_boo/iv_3.html >. The United States ratified the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights on June 8, 1992. See United Nations Treaty Database (visited
Oct. 12, 1999) <http:l/www.un.orglDepts/Treaty/finall ts2/newfles/parLboo/ivboo
iv_4.html >.
95. The members of the United Nations' General Assembly voted 48 to zero, with
eight abstentions, for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on Dec. 10, 1948. See
United Nations, Fiftieth Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Press
Kit (visited Oct. 12, 1999) <httpllwww.un.orglrights/50/carta.htm>. The International Cov-
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for any act to constitute a crime against humanity under the ICC stat-
ute are actually more restrictive than existing legal documents on the
subject. The ICC statute requires that there be "multiple commission
of acts" and that they be carried out "pursuant to or in furtherance of
a State or organizational policy."96 These dual requirements, coupled
with the requirement that the acts be carried out "with knowledge of
the attack,"97 impose a very high threshold for acts to be considered
crimes against humanity in the context of the ICC. Thus, any act pros-
ecuted under the ICC statute as a crime against humanity must meet
standards stricter than those imposed in existing international legal
instruments.
The ICC's definition of war crimes 98 is also taken from estab-
lished provisions of international law, principally the Hague Conven-
tion99 and the four Geneva Conventions,l" ° and their optional
protocols.' 01 All of these documents show that the definition of war
crimes in the ICC statute is a well-established definition in interna-
enant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has been ratified by 142 nations. See
United Nations Treaty Database (visited Oct. 12, 1999) <http:lwww.un.orglDeptsl Treaty/
flnallts2lnewfileslpartboo/ivbooliv__3.html >. The International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights has been ratified by 144 nations. See United Nations Treaty Database (vis-
ited Oct. 12, 1999) <http://www.un.orglDepts/Treaty/final/ts2/newfiles/ partLboo/iv_boo/
iv_4.html >.
96. ICC statute, supra note 14, art. 7 (2) (a).
97. ICC statute, supra note 14, art. 7 (1).
98. See ICC statute, supra note 14, art. 8.
99. See Convention (No. IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct.
18, 1907, 1 U.S.T.S. 539, entered into force Jan. 26, 1910. The United States ratified this
convention on Nov. 27, 1909. See University of Minnesota Human Rights Library (visited
Oct. 12, 1999) <http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/1907c.htm>.
100. See Convention (No. I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, 6 U.S.T.S. 3114, entered
into force Oct. 21, 1950; Convention (No. II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 75
U.N.T.S. 85,6 U.S.T.S 3114, entered into force Oct. 21, 1950; Convention (No. III) relative
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 6 U.S.T.S. 3114,
entered into force Oct. 21, 1950; and Convention (No. IV) relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 6 U.S.T.S. 3114, entered
into force Oct. 21, 1950. The United States ratified these conventions on Aug. 2, 1955. See
University of Minnesota Human Rights Library (visited Oct. 12, 1999) <http:ll
wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/auoy.htm>.
101. See Protocol Additional (No. I) to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949,
and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 16
I.L.M. 1391 (1977), entered into force Dec. 7, 1978; and Protocol Additional (No. II) to the
Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 16 I.L.M. 1442 (1977), entered into force Dec.
7, 1978. The United States signed both protocols on Dec. 12, 1977, but has not yet ratified
them. See University of Minnesota Human Rights Library (visited Oct. 12, 1999) <http://
wwwl.umn.edu/ humanrts/instree/1977a.htm>. Yet the first protocol has been ratified by
147 nations and the second by 139 nations. See id.
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tional law.102 Thus, all three of the crimes currently defined within the
ICC statute meet the requirements of notice and specificity demanded
by the United States Constitution.
B. Other Aspects of the ICC Statute Addressing United States
Concerns
1. Complementarity to National Legal Systems
Perhaps the most important provision of the ICC statute is its
relationship to national legal systems. The ICC statute provides that
the ICC "shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdic-
tions.' 013 This system of complementarity is a threshold of admissibil-
ity, which applies to ensure that the ICC will have jurisdiction only in
exceptional cases, as a sort of international safety net to prevent impu-
nity for serious international crimes.104 The ICC statute requires that
cases "being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdic-
tion over [them]' 0 5 and cases that already "ha[ve] been investigated
by a State which has jurisdiction over [them] and the State has de-
cided not to prosecute the person[s] concerned"'1 6 are not admissible
to the ICC. Those cases do not meet the ICC statute's threshold of
admissibility because those cases are already being dealt with by na-
tional legal systems.
There is, however, an exception to this threshold of admissibility.
Under the ICC statute, the ICC may determine that a case is admissi-
ble before it if the state concerned "is unwilling or unable genuinely to
carry out the investigation or prosecution."'0 7 The ICC statute de-
fines the first standard, "unwillingness," in one of three ways.' 8 First,
a state is unwilling when its proceedings were made "for the purpose
of shielding the person concerned." 0 9 Second, a state is unwilling
when there is "an unjustified delay" in proceedings by the state under
circumstances "inconsistent with an intent to bring the person con-
cerned to justice." 10 And third, a state is unwilling when its proceed-
ings "were not or are not being conducted independently or
impartially" but were or are being conducted under circumstances "in-
102. The four Geneva Conventions have each been ratified by 188 nations. See United
Nations Treaty Database (visited Mar. 16, 1999) <http://www.un.orgfDepts/Treaty>. As
stated above, the two protocols have each been ratified by approximately 140 nations. See
id.
103. ICC statute, supra note 14, art. 1. See also ICC statute, supra note 15, preamble.
104. See ICC statute, supra note 14, art. 17.
105. Id art. 17 (1) (a).
106. Id art. 17 (1) (b).
107. Id art. 17 (1) (a) and (b).
108. See id. art. 17 (2).
109. Id. art. 17 (2) (a).
110. Id art. 17 (2) (b).
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consistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice.""'
The ICC statute defines the second standard, "inability," as a sit-
uation in which, "due to a total or substantial collapse or unavailabil-
ity of its national judicial system, the State is unable to obtain the
accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or otherwise unable
to carry out its proceedings.""' Thus, a state that is both willing and
able to investigate and, if required, prosecute a matter may proceed,
even if the matter concerned would otherwise fall into one of the
crimes under the ICC statute's limited jurisdiction.
The main and most salient concern of the United States is that its
armed forces could conceivably be brought before the ICC and prose-
cuted for acts they commit abroad while involved in humanitarian
assistance or peacekeeping. 113 This concern is without merit for three
reasons. First and foremost, the ICC statute's system of complemen-
tarity and its deference to national legal systems provide the best as-
surance for the United States that United States citizens are unlikely
ever to be tried by the ICC, unless the United States government itself
allows it." 4
Second, as commentators have stated, the United States govern-
ment's peacekeeping and humanitarian interventions are generally
recognized by the international community as in the general interest
and respectful of international law." 5 If there is no violation of inter-
national law by American troops abroad, there is no crime and thus
no need to bring anyone to trial. The ICC would not be relevant in
such a situation because no crime was committed that need be prose-
cuted. Nevertheless, when the United States does act with strong-arm
tactics and violates international law in pursuit of narrow American
interests while not maintaining international world order, why should
Americans who commit atrocities not be tried and held accountable
for their actions? Why should the citizens of one state be immune
from standards applicable to the rest of the global community? Under
the complementary system of the ICC statute, the United States can
try their own nationals within the United States. The horror of atroci-
ties such as genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes is not
lessened if they are committed by persons who happen to be Ameri-
can citizens. Sheltering such persons under an umbrella of military
might simply because they are American citizens would allow the
political powers of the world to dominate every determination, rather
than allow the entire international community, through the ICC, to
111. Id. art. 17 (2) (c).
112. Id art. 17 (3).
113. See Scheffer, supra note 32; see also 144 CONG. R-c. S8554 supra, note 32.
114. See ICC statute, supra note 14, art. 17.
115. See William Pfaff, U.S. Policy on U.N. Court Gives Tacit Approval to Lawlessness,
BALrnmORE SuN, Aug. 12, 1998, at 15A.
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bring justice to matters involving "the most serious crimes of interna-
tional concern. 11 6 Allowing sheer power to determine right would
certainly be wrong.
Third, the ICC statute is meant to protect persons working with
international humanitarian assistance programs as well as interna-
tional peacekeepers." 7 The ICC statute specifically states that it is a
war crime to attack "personnel, installations, material, units or vehi-
cles involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission as
long as they are entitled to the protection given to civilians or civilian
objects under the international law of armed conflict.""'  Intention-
ally directing attacks against such personnel or objects is considered a
war crime under the ICC statute." 9 If the United States is truly con-
cerned about the members of its armed forces serving abroad, the
United States should accept the ICC statute to ensure that they are
adequately protected.
In conclusion, it must again be emphasized that the ICC statute's
complementary system and its deference to national legal systems pro-
vide the best assurance for the United States that its citizens are un-
likely ever to be tried by the ICC without United States approval. It is
hard to imagine a situation in which the United States would be un-
willing or unable to investigate or prosecute a crime within its national
legal system, the threshold required for a crime to be admissible into
the jurisdiction of the ICC. Interested states, under the ICC statute,
have primacy over the ICC when they are willing and able to genu-
inely proceed. 2
2. Limitations on the Authority of the Prosecutor
The ICC is composed of four organs, one of which is the office of
the prosecutor.'2' The ICC prosecutor is elected through a secret bal-
lot by an absolute majority of the states party to the ICC statute. 22
The United States has criticized the ICC statute by claiming that there
are few or no limits on the ICC prosecutor."z The United States has
claimed that the independence of the ICC prosecutor "will encourage
116. ICC statute, supra note 14, art. 1.
117. See ICC statute, supra note 14, art. 8 (2) (b) (iii) & (xxiv); ICC statute, supra note
14, art. 8 (2) (e) (ii) & (iii).
118. ICC statute, supra note 14, art. 8 (2) (b) (iii).
119. See id.
120. See ICC statute, supra note 14, art. 17 (1).
121. See ICC statute, supra note 14, art. 34. The four organs are (a) the Presidency, (b)
an Appeals Division, a Trial Division, and a Pre-Trial Division, (c) the Office of the Prose-
cutor, and (d) the Registry. Id. See also ICC statute, supra note 14, art. 42.
122. See ICC statute, supra note 14, art. 42 (4).
123. See Scheffer, supra note 32; see also 144 CONG. REc. S8554 (daily ed. July 20,1998)
(statement of Sen. Ashcroft).
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overwhelming the court with complaints and risk diversion of its re-
sources, as well as embroil the court in controversy, political decision-
making, and confusion."' 24 This is not true.
There are numerous limitations on the authority of the prosecu-
tor. For example, the ICC prosecutor is prohibited from participating
in any matter in which her impartiality "might reasonably be doubted
on any ground."'" In such cases, the prosecutor must be disqualified,
as determined by the Appeals Chamber of the ICC.12 6
There are three entities that may initiate an investigation. 127 The
prosecutor may investigate when a state party to the ICC statute re-
fers the matter,"2 when the United Nations Security Council refers
the matter, 29 or when the prosecutor herself initiates investigation of
the matter. 30 The prosecutor's proprio motu power is the United
States' biggest criticism of the ICC prosecutor.131 But there are
checks and balances built into this process. First, the prosecutor can-
not begin an investigation until she has permission from the Pre-trial
Chamber, composed of three judges.'3 2 Second, the prosecutor's in-
vestigations at the site of alleged crimes are only possible where the
relevant national authorities are unavailable themselves to take the
necessary investigative steps. 33 Third, the prosecutor may be present
and assist national authorities in their investigations only if such is not
prohibited by the applicable national law.' 34 Fourth, the suspect and
any interested states may challenge the prosecutor's investigation.'35
Fifth, the accused and all interested states may challenge the jurisdic-
tion of the ICC or the admissibility of the matter at issue at the trial
stage. "'36 Sixth, as discussed above, the prosecutor is obliged to defer
to states willing and able to pursue their own investigations. 37 And
finally, the United Nations Security Council may request the ICC to
defer the investigation or prosecution of a particular case for renewa-
ble periods of 12 months. 38
124. Id.
125. ICC statute, supra note 14, art. 42 (7).
126. See id.; see also ICC statute, supra note 14, art. 42 (8).
127. See ICC statute, supra note 14, art. 13.
128. See ICC statute, supra note 14, art. 13 (a).
129. See ICC statute, supra note 14, art. 13 (b).
130. See ICC statute, supra note 14, art. 13 (c); see generally ICC statute, supra note 14,
art. 15.
131. See Scheffer, supra note 32.
132. See ICC statute, supra note 14, art. 15 (3).
133. See ICC statute, supra note 14, art. 57 (3).
134. See ICC statute, supra note 14, art. 99 (1).
135. See ICC statute, supra note 14, art. 18.
136. See ICC statute, supra note 14, art. 19 (2).
137. See ICC statute, supra note 14, art. 17 (1).
138. See ICC statute, supra note 14, art. 16.
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A proprio motu prosecutor is necessary to ensure that interna-
tional crimes are investigated and prosecuted, especially when states
and the Security Council fail to respond to matters for political rea-
sons. Given all of the limitations above, the proprio motu prosecutor
actually protects against "controversy, political decision-making, and
confusion,' 39 the United States' pronounced concerns.
IV. Conclusion
The ICC has enormous potential to limit impunity for "the most
serious crimes of international concern,"'140 to provide justice for vic-
tims, and to deter future atrocities. The ICC statute itself, given its
overwhelming support in the international community, represents a
major achievement for international human rights. It offers accused
persons a myriad of protections, conforms to the requirements of the
United States Constitution, and comports with "the highest interna-
tional standards and guarantees of due process and fair trial."'' As
the most powerful nation in the world, and one that advocates human
rights within the world forum, the United States should sign and ratify
the ICC statute. This would ensure that the United States maintains
its role as a leader in promoting international human rights. It would
also ensure that the United States has a voice in the evolution of the
ICC as a strong and effective global court, a court that is an essential
stride toward global responsibility for human rights.
139. Scheffer, supra note 32.
140. ICC statute, supra note 14, art. 1.
141. Setting the Record Straight, supra note 2, at 1.
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